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Minimax Adaptive Control for State Matrix with Unknown Sign
Anders Rantzer
Lund University, Sweden (e-mail: rantzer@control.lth.se).
Abstract: For linear time-invariant systems having a state matrix with uncertain sign, we
formulate a minimax adaptive control problem as a zero sum dynamic game. Explicit expressions
for the optimal value function and the optimal control law are given in terms of a Riccati
equation. The optimal control law is adaptive in the sense the past data is used to estimate
the uncertain sign for prediction of future dynamics. Once the sign has been estimated, the
controller behaves like standard H∞ optimal state feedback.
Keywords: Adaptive control, linear systems, robust control, game theory
1. INTRODUCTION
The history of adaptive control dates back at least to
aircraft autopilot development in the 1950s. Following the
landmark paper A˚stro¨m and Wittenmark [1973], a surge
of research activity during the 1970s derived conditions for
convergence, stability, robustness and performance under
various assumptions. For example, Ljung [1977] analysed
adaptive algorithms using averaging, Goodwin et al. [1981]
derived an algorithm that gives mean square stability
with probability one, while Guo [1995] gave conditions
for the optimal asymptotic rate of convergence. On the
other hand, conditions that may cause instability were
studied in Egardt [1979], Ioannou and Kokotovic [1984]
and Rohrs et al. [1985]. Altogether, the subject has a
rich history documented in numerous textbooks, such as
A˚stro¨m and Wittenmark [2013], Goodwin and Sin [2014],
Narendra and Annaswamy [2012], Sastry and Bodson
[2011] and Astolfi et al. [2007]. In this paper, the focus
is on worst-case models for disturbances and uncertain
parameters, as discussed in Cusumano and Poolla [1988],
Sun and Ioannou [1987], Megretski and Rantzer [2003].
The “minimax adaptive” paradigm was investigated for
linear systems in Didinsky and Basar [1994] and nonlinear
systems in Pan and Basar [1998].
The outline is as follows: Sections 2 introduces notation.
Section 3 states the problem and reformulates it as a zero
sum dynamic game on standard form. The main results are
presented in section 4 together with some examples. The
main proofs are given in section 5, with some supporting
arguments deferred to the Appendix. Finally, an example
and concluding remarks are given in section 6-7.
2. NOTATION
The set of n×m matrices with real coefficients is denoted
R
n×m. The transpose of M is denoted M⊤. For a sym-
metric matrix M ∈ Rn×n, we write M ≻ 0 to say that
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European Research Council. The work was also partially supported
by the Wallenberg AI, Autonomous Systems and Software Program
(WASP) funded by the Knut and Alice Wallenberg Foundation.
M is positive definite, while M  0 means positive semi-
definite. ForM,N ∈ Rn×m, the expression 〈M,N〉 denotes
the trace of M⊤N . Given x ∈ Rn and a positive definite
M ∈ Rn×n, the notation |x|2M means x
⊤Mx. Similarly,
given N ∈ Rm×n and a positive definite M ∈ Rn×n, the
notation ‖N‖2M means the trace of N
⊤MN .
3. MINIMAX ADAPTIVE CONTROL
This paper is devoted to the following problem:
LetQ ∈ Rn×n and R ∈ Rm×m be positive definite matrices
and let B ∈ Rn×m. Given A ∈ Rn×n, a number γ > 0 and
an initial state x0, find, if possible, a control law µ that
attains the infimum
inf
µ
sup
w,i,T
T∑
t=0
(
|xt|
2
Q + |ut|
2
R − γ
2|wt|
2
)
(1)
where i ∈ {−1, 1}, wt ∈ R
n, T ≥ 0 and the sequences x
and u are generated according to
xt+1 = iAxt +But + wt t ≥ 0 (2)
ut = µt(x0, . . . , xt, u0, . . . , ut−1). (3)
The problem can be viewed as a dynamic game, where the
µ-player tries to minimize the cost, while the (w, i)-player
tries to maximize it. If it wasn’t for the parameter i, this
would be the standard game formulation of H∞ optimal
control Basar and Bernhard [1995]. In our formulation,
the maximizing player can choose not only w, but also the
parameter i. This parameter is unknown, but constant,
so an optimal feedback law tends to “learn” the value
of i in the beginning, in order to exploit this knowledge
later. Such nonlinear adaptive controllers can stabilize and
optimize the behavior also when no linear controller can
simultaneously stabilize (2) for both i = 1 and i = −1.
To accommodate the uncertainty in i when deciding ut,
it is sufficient for the controller to consider historical data
collected in the matrix
Zt =
t−1∑
τ=0
[
Buτ − xτ+1
xτ
] [
Buτ − xτ+1
xτ
]⊤
(4)
since this gives ‖[I iA]‖
2
Zt
=
∑t−1
τ=0 |wt|
2.
Our problem can thus be reformulated as follows:
Given Q ≻ 0, R ≻ 0, γ > 0 and a system{
xt+1 = vt
Zt+1 = Zt +
[
But − vt
xt
] [
But − vt
xt
]⊤
, Z0 = 0
(5)
find, if possible, a control law
ut = η(xt, Zt) (6)
that attains the infimum
inf
η
sup
v,T
[
− γ2min
i
‖[I iA]‖
2
ZT+1
+
T∑
t=0
(
|xt|
2
Q + |ut|
2
R
) ]
(7)
when x, u, Z are generated from v according to (5)-(6).
In this formulation, the unknown sign i does not appear
in the dynamics, only in the penalty of the final state. As
a consequence, no past states are needed in the control
law (6), only the state (xt, Zt). In fact, the problem is a
standard zero-sum dynamic game Basar and Olsder [1999],
which can be addressed by dynamic programming. Hence
we define the operator V 7→ FV by
FV (x, Z) :=
min
u
max
v
{
|x|2Q + |u|
2
R + V
(
v, Z +
[
Bu− v
x
] [
Bu− v
x
]⊤)}
.
and summarize this section by stating the following:
Theorem 1. Suppose that the Bellman equation FV∗ = V∗
has a solution V∗ ∈ C(R
n × R2n×2n) satisfying
− γ2min
i
‖ [I iA] ‖2Z ≤ V∗(x, Z) ≤ γ
2|x|2 (8)
for all Z  0 and x ∈ Rn. Then V∗(x0, 0) is equal to
the values of (1) and (7). The minimizing argument of the
right hand side in the Bellman equation defines an optimal
control law η : (x, Z) 7→ u for (7), while the control law µ
defined by
µt(x0, . . . , xt, u0, . . . , ut−1)
= η
(
xt,
t−1∑
τ=0
[
Buτ − xτ+1
xτ
] [
Buτ − xτ+1
xτ
]⊤)
(9)
is optimal for (1). Conversely, if no V∗ exists, then (1) and
(7) have no finite values.
The proof is given in section 5.
4. SOLUTION TO THE BELLMAN EQUATION
The following result, Theorem 2, gives an explicit expres-
sion for the minimax optimal adaptive controller for a
range of γ-values. It is followed by Theorem 3, which gives
a lower bound on the values of γ for which a solution exists.
Theorem 2. Given A ∈ Rn×n and some positive definite
Q ∈ Rn×n, R ∈ Rm×m, assume that
|x|2P = minu
max
v
{
|x|2Q + |u|
2
R − γ
2|Ax +Bu− v|2 + |v|2P
}
has a solution 0 ≺ P ≺ γ2I. Define
S := (P−1 − γ−2I)−1 T := Q+A⊤SA.
Suppose that T ≺ γ2I and
T  Q+
1
4
A⊤(T−1 − γ−2I)−1A−
3
4
γ2A⊤A. (10)
Then the Bellman equation FV∗ = V∗ and the inequalities
(8) are satisfied by V∗ := FV , where
V (x, Z) := max
i∈{−1,1}
{
|x|2P − γ
2 ‖[I iA]‖
2
Z
}
(11)
The optimal control law for the dynamic game is
ut =

Kxt if
∑t−1
τ=0(Buτ − xτ+1)
⊤Axτ
|xt|2T−P
≥ 1
−Kxt if
∑t−1
τ=0(Buτ − xτ+1)
⊤Axτ
|xt|2T−P
≤ −1∑t−1
τ=0(Buτ − xτ+1)
⊤Axτ
|xt|2T−P
Kx otherwise.
Theorem 3. With A,B, P,Q,R, S, T as in Theorem 2, the
Bellman equation FV∗ = V∗ has no solution satisfying the
inequalities (8) unless 0 ≺ P ≺ γ2I and T  γ2I.
Remark 1. The intuition behind the optimal control law
in Theorem 2 is simple: The first two cases describe the
situation when historical data collected in the expression∑t−1
τ=0(Buτ −xτ+1)
⊤Axτ is rich enough to make a reliable
estimate about the uncertain parameter i. This estimate
is then used used as truth and the corresponding H∞
state feedback control law is applied. In the third case,
the historical data does not give a conclusive answer, so
the controller gain is down-scaled accordingly.
Remark 2. If n = m = Q = R = A = B = 1, then
Theorem 2 gives an optimal strategy for the dynamic game
(7) whenever γ > 2.13. On the other hand, Theorem 3
shows that the game has no finite value unless γ ≥ 2.01.
More details will be given in Section 6.
5. THE MAIN PROOFS.
First consider a more limited problem:
min
u
max
i∈{−1,1}
{
|x|2Q + |u|
2
R + |iAx+Bu|
2
S − 2〈iA, Y 〉
}
where Y is an arbitrary matrix parameter. In other words:
The problem is to find a control signal u to minimize a
worst case quadratic cost for ±A, with Y representing
prior knowledge.
The solution is given by the following lemma:
Lemma 4. Given A,B, P,Q,R, S, suppose that
|x|2P = min
u
{
|x|2Q + |u|
2
R + |Ax+Bu|
2
S
}
, (12)
where the minimizing u is given by u = −Kx with
K := (R+B⊤SB)−1B⊤SA.
Put Π := Q +A⊤SA− P . Then
min
u
max
i∈{−1,1}
{
|x|2Q + |u|
2
R + |iAx+Bu|
2
S − 2〈iA, Y 〉
}
=
{
|x|2P + 2|〈A, Y 〉| if |〈A, Y 〉| ≥ |x|
2
Π
|x|2P+Π + 〈A, Y 〉
2|x|−2
Π
otherwise
(13)
and the minimizing value of u is
û =

Kx if 〈A, Y 〉 ≥ |x|2Π
−Kx if 〈A, Y 〉 ≤ −|x|2Π
〈A, Y 〉
|x|2
Π
Kx otherwise.
(14)
Proof. The definition of K gives
B⊤SA = (R+B⊤SB)K.
Multiplication by K⊤ from the left, and application of the
identity
P = Q+K⊤RK + (A−BK)⊤S(A−BK)
gives
K⊤B⊤SA = A⊤SBK = K⊤(R+B⊤SB)K = Π.
The minimax theorem for convex-concave functions gives
min
u
max
i∈{−1,1}
{
|x|2Q + |u|
2
R + |iAx+Bu|
2
S − 2〈iA, Y 〉
}
max
θ
min
u
∑
i∈{−1,1}
θi
{
|x|2Q + |u|
2
R + |iAx+Bu|
2
S − 2〈iA, Y 〉
}
where θ−1, θ1 ∈ [0, 1] satisfy θ−1 + θ1 = 1. The minimum
over u is attained by
u = (1 − 2θ1)Kx. (15)
Moreover, if 〈A, Y 〉 ≥ |x|2Π, the maximum over θ is attained
by θ1 = 0 and the value is |x|
2
P + 2〈A, Y 〉. On the other
hand, if 〈A, Y 〉 ≤ −|x|2Π, the maximum is given by θ1 = 1
and the value is |x|2P − 2〈A, Y 〉. Finally, if |〈A, Y 〉| < |x|
2
Π,
the optimal value of θ1 is in the interior of the interval
[0, 1] and determined by
|Ax −Bu|2S + 2〈A, Y 〉 = |Ax+Bu|
2
S − 2〈A, Y 〉
〈A, Y 〉 = x⊤A⊤SBu
= (1− 2θ1)x
⊤A⊤SBKx
= (1− 2θ1)|x|
2
Π.
This gives u = |x|−2
Π
〈A, Y 〉Kx and the value∑
i
θi
{
|x|2Q + |u|
2
R + |Aix+ Bu|
2
S − 2〈Ai, Y 〉
}
= |x|2Q + |u|
2
R + |Ax|
2
S + |Bu|
2
S
= |x|2Q + |Ax|
2
S + |(1− 2θ1)Kx|
2
R+B⊤SB
= |x|2P+Π + (1− 2θ1)
2|x|2Π
= |x|2P+Π + 〈A, Y 〉
2|x|−2
Π
.
Equipped with Lemma 4, together with Lemma 7 in the
Appendix, we are now ready to prove the main result:
Proof of Theorem 2. Putting S := (P−1−γ−2I)−1 and
eliminating v from the definition of P gives (12). Let
Z :=
[
Zvv Y
Y ⊤ Zxx
]
Π := T − P
W (x, Z) := max
i
{
|x|2T − γ
2
〈[
I iA/2
iA⊤/2 A⊤A
]
, Z
〉}
U(x, Z) := max{V (x, Z),W (x, Z)}
and notice that U(x, Z) ≤ γ2|x|2 for Z  0.
We will first prove that FV ≤ U . Lemma 4 gives
FV (x, Z) + γ2 trace(Zvv) + γ
2 trace(AZxxA
⊤)− |x|2Q
= inf
u
sup
v
{
|u|2R + V
(
v,
[
0 Y
Y
⊤ 0
]
+
[
Bu− v
x
][
Bu− v
x
]⊤)}
= min
u
max
v,i
{
|u|2R + |v|
2
P − γ
2|iAx+Bu− v|2 − 2γ2〈iA, Y 〉
}
= min
u
max
i
{
|u|2R + |iAx+Bu|
2
S − 2γ
2〈iA, Y 〉
}
=
{
|x|2P−Q + 2γ
2|〈A, Y 〉| if γ2|〈A,Y 〉| ≥ |x|
2
Π
|x|2T−Q + γ
4〈A, Y 〉2|x|−2
Π
otherwise
≤ max
{
|x|2P−Q + 2γ
2|〈A, Y 〉|, |x|2T−Q + γ
2|〈A, Y 〉|
}
= U(x, Z) + γ2 trace(Zvv) + γ
2 trace(AZxxA
⊤)− |x|2Q.
Hence FV ≤ U .
Our next step will to prove that FU ≤ FV . For this, we
consider û defined by (14). Let X := (T−1 − γ−2I)−1 and
θ := |û|/|Kx|. Then
sup
v
{
|û|2R +W
(
v,
[
0 Y
Y
⊤ 0
]
+
[
Bû− v
x
] [
Bû− v
x
]⊤)}
= max
v,i
{
|û|2R + |v|
2
T − 3γ
2|Ax|2/4
− γ2|iAx/2 +Bû− v|2 − γ2〈iA, Y 〉
}
= max
i
{
|û|2R +
∣∣∣ iAx
2
+Bû
∣∣∣2
X
− 3γ2
|Ax|2
4
− γ2〈iA, Y 〉
}
= |θKx|2R +
∣∣∣Ax
2
− θBKx
∣∣∣2
X
− 3γ2
|Ax|2
4
+ γ2 |〈A, Y 〉|
≤ |θKx|2R +
∣∣∣Ax
2
− θBKx
∣∣∣2
S
+ 3γ2
|Ax|2
4
+ γ2 |〈A, Y 〉|
= |θKx|2R +
∣∣∣Ax− θBKx∣∣∣2
S
+ θ|x|2Π + γ
2 |〈A, Y 〉|
≤ sup
v
{
|û|2R + V
(
v,
[
0 Y
Y
⊤ 0
]
+
[
Bû− v
x
] [
Bû− v
x
]⊤)}
where the first inequality is proved in Lemma 7 and the
second follows from convexity in θ. Hence, it follows from
the definition of U that
sup
v
{
|û|2R + U
(
v,
[
0 Y
Y
⊤ 0
]
+
[
Bû− v
x
] [
Bû− v
x
]⊤)}
(16)
≤ sup
v
{
|û|2R + V
(
v,
[
0 Y
Y
⊤ 0
]
+
[
Bû− v
x
] [
Bû− v
x
]⊤)}
so FU ≤ FV . The opposite inequality holds trivially since
V ≤ U , so we have verified that FU = FV ≤ U .
Finally, the definition V∗ := FV gives V ≤ V∗ ≤ U and
therefore FV ≤ FV∗ ≤ FU . The fact that the upper and
lower bound are equal implies that FV = FV∗, so V∗ solves
the Bellman equation V∗ = FV∗ as stated. Moreover, the
inequalities (8) follow from the fact that
−γ2min
i
‖ [I iA] ‖2Z ≤ V ≤ V∗ ≤ U ≤ γ
2|x|2.
It remains to verify the expression for the optimal control
law η(x, Z). We know from the inequalities V ≤ V∗ ≤ U
combined with (16) that
sup
v
{
|û|2R + V∗
(
v,
[
0 Y
Y
⊤ 0
]
+
[
Bû− v
x
] [
Bû− v
x
]⊤)}
= sup
v
{
|û|2R + V
(
v,
[
0 Y
Y
⊤ 0
]
+
[
Bû− v
x
] [
Bû− v
x
]⊤)}
The minimizer of the right hand side is û, which therefore
must be a minimizer also for the left hand side. Hence it
is the minimizing argument of the Bellman equation and
is therefore equal to the optimal control law.
Proof of Theorem 3. Suppose that the Bellman equa-
tion FV∗ = V∗ has a solution satisfying the inequalities
(8). Define recursively
Vk+1 = FVk, V0(x, Z) = −γ
2‖ [I A] ‖2Z .
Then Vk(x, Z) = |x|
2
Pk
− γ2‖ [I A] ‖2Z , where the matrix
sequence P0  P1  P2 . . . is obtained from P0 = 0 and
the Riccati recursion
|x|2Pk+1 = minu
max
v
{
|x|2Q + |u|
2
R − γ
2|Ax +Bu− v|2 + |v|2Pk
}
From Vk(x, 0) ≤ V∗(x, Z) ≤ γ
2|x|2 we get 0 ≺ P ≺ γ2I for
P := limk→∞ Pk. Define V∞ := limk→∞ Vk. Then
V∗(x, 0) ≥ FV∞(x, 0) = |x|
2
T
so T  γ2I. This completes the proof of Theorem 3.
Proof of Theorem 1. Recall that (1) takes the form
inf
µ
sup
w,i,T
T∑
t=0
(
|xt|
2
Q + |ut|
2
R − γ
2|wt|
2
)
where i ∈ {−1, 1}, wt ∈ R
n, T ≥ 0 and the sequences
x and u are generated according to (2)-(3). Note that
supremum over T is obtained as T → ∞, since w can
be turned off at any time to make the remaining cost non-
negative. A change of variables with vt = xt+1 and Zt
given by (4) shows that (1) is equal to
inf
µ
sup
v,T
[
−γ2min
i
‖[I iA]‖
2
ZT+1
+
T∑
t=0
(
|xt|
2
Q + |ut|
2
R
)]
,
(17)
where x, Z, u are generated by (5) combined with (3).
For k = 0, 1, 2, . . ., define the monotonically increasing
sequence
V0(x, Z) := −γ
2min
i
‖ [I iA] ‖2Z
Vk+1(x, Z) := FVk(x, Z).
Standard dynamic programming shows that
VT+1(x0, 0)
= inf
µ
sup
v
[
−γ2min
i
‖[I iA]‖
2
ZT+1
+
T∑
t=0
(
|xt|
2
Q + |ut|
2
R
)]
(18)
and the infimum is attained by the policy defining ut as
the minimizing argument of
min
u
max
v
{
|x|2Q + |u|
2
R + VT−t
(
v, Z +
[
Bu− v
x
] [
Bu− v
x
]⊤)}
.
Suppose now that the Bellman equation FV∗ = V∗ has
a solution satisfying (8). Then limk→∞ Vk = V∗, so the
value of (17) is V∗(x0, 0) and the infimum is attained
by the policy defining ut from (xt, Zt) as the minimizing
argument of
min
u
max
v
{
|xt|
2
Q + |u|
2
R + V∗
(
v, Zt +
[
Bu− v
xt
] [
Bu− v
xt
]⊤)}
.
This proves that (1) and (7) are equal and have the stated
minimizing arguments. Conversely, if no solution V∗ exists,
the sequence V0, V1, V2, . . . has no upper bound, so (1) and
(7) have no finite values.
6. EXAMPLE
Recall the case n = m = Q = R = A = B = 1 from
Remark 2 in section 4. We will now consider the statements
of Theorem 2 in more detail. First put γ = 2.13. Solving
the Riccati equation
Px2 = min
u
max
v
{
Qx2 +Ru2 − γ2|Ax +Bu− v|2 + Pv2
}
gives P = 1.738, which is clearly in the interval [0, γ2].
It follows that S = 2.825, T = 3.825 and condition (10)
marginally holds, since the right hand side takes the value
3.824. It is easy to see that for larger γ, the margin would
be bigger.
An exact expression for the value function V∗ = FV can
now be computed using formula (13) in Lemma 4. This
shows that
V∗
(
x,
[
Zvv Y
Y
⊤
Zxx
])
= |x|2P if |〈A, Y 〉| ≥ |x|
2
T−P
V∗
(
x,
[
Zvv Y
Y
⊤
Zxx
])
= |x|2T if 〈A, Y 〉 = 0
and for |〈A, Y 〉| in between, the Y -dependence in V∗ is
quadratic.
7. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, we have formulated a control problem for
uncertain linear systems as a zero-sum dynamic game. The
solution is remarkable for two reasons:
(1) The corresponding dynamic programming formula-
tion has an explicit solution in terms of a Riccati
equation.
(2) The resulting optimal controller is adaptive: It re-
duces the aggressiveness of the controller until until
enough data has been collected to get a parameter
estimate that can be confidently trusted.
The results are likely to be extendable to many other
uncertainty structures. The case of uncertain input matrix
B will be particularly important, since the controller then
needs to make active exploration in order to collect enough
data for the exploitation phase.
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APPENDIX: SUPPORTING LEMMATA
Lemma 5. Let S ∈ Rn×n and R ∈ Rm×m be symmetric
and positive definite, while B ∈ Rn×m. Then
S−1  B(R+B⊤SB)−1B⊤.
Proof.
S−1 −B(R +B⊤SB)−1B⊤
= S−1 −BR−1(I +B⊤SBR−1)−1B⊤
= S−1 − (I +BR−1B⊤S)−1BR−1B⊤
= S−1 − S−1(S−1 +BR−1B⊤)−1BR−1B⊤
= S−1(S−1 +BR−1B⊤)−1S−1  0
Lemma 6. Let M,N be symmetric matrices with
−N M  N.
Then M2  N2.
Proof. The result is trivial after simultaneous diagonal-
ization of M and N .
Lemma 7. Given A,B,Q,R, S,X and θ ∈ [0, 1], let
K := (R+B⊤SB)−1B⊤SA.
Suppose that
X  4S + 3γ2I (19)
Then
(A− 2θBK)⊤X(A− 2θBK)− 3γ2A⊤A
 (A− 2θBK)⊤S(A− 2θBK) + 3A⊤SA. (20)
Proof. Define
M = (S + γ2)1/2(I − 2θBKA−1)S−1(S + γ2)1/2
N = (I + γ2S−1)
Notice that
BKA−1S−1 = B(R+B⊤SB)−1B⊤
so M is symmetric and
M  (S + γ2)1/2S−1(S + γ2)1/2 = N.
Moreover Lemma 5 shows that
S−1 − 2θBKA−1S−1  −S−1
so
M  −(S + γ2)1/2S−1(S + γ2)1/2 = −N
and Lemma 6 gives M2  N2. Multiplying this inequality
from right and left by (S + γ2)−1/2S gives
(I − 2θBKA−1)⊤(S + γ2I)(I − 2θBKA−1)  S + γ2I
Multiplication from the right by A, from the left by AT
and application of (19) gives (20).
